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 We examine volumes of oil that cannot be used up to 2035 in a low CO2 energy system.
 500–600 billion barrels of current 2P reserves remain unused.
 At least 40–55% of yet to be found deepwater resources must not be developed.
 Arctic oil and most light tight oil resources remain undeveloped.
 Unconventional oil production is generally incompatible with a low CO2 energy system.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper examines the volumes of oil that can and cannot be used up to 2035 during the transition to a
low-carbon global energy system using the global energy systems model, TIAM-UCL and the ‘Bottom up
Economic and Geological Oil ﬁeld production model’ (BUEGO). Globally in a scenario allowing the
widespread adoption of carbon capture and storage (CCS) nearly 500 billion barrels of existing 2P oil
reserves must remain unused by 2035. In a scenario where CCS is unavailable this increases to around 600
billion barrels. Besides reserves, arctic oil and light tight oil play only minor roles in a scenario with CCS and
essentially no role when CCS is not available. On a global scale, 40% of those resources yet to be found in
deepwater regions must remain undeveloped, rising to 55% if CCS cannot be deployed. The widespread
development of unconventional oil resources is also shown to be incompatible with a decarbonised energy
system even with a total and rapid decarbonisation of energetic inputs. The work thus demonstrates the
extent to which current energy policies encouraging the unabated exploration for, and exploitation of, all
oil resources are incommensurate with the achievement of a low-carbon energy system.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
There is widespread agreement in the scientiﬁc community that
increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 will lead to an
increase in average global temperatures (see e.g. Solomon et al.,
2007). Various methods have been described in the literature that
relate levels and impacts of climate change, and their associated
probabilities of occurrence, to levels of emissions of greenhouse
gases (GHG) or CO2. Authors have for example related the prob-
ability of different levels of temperature rise to: stabilisation at
various atmospheric concentrations of CO2 or GHG (Solomon et al.,
2007), cutting emissions from current levels by certain factors
(Stern, 2006), or the date of a global peak and subsequent decline
in emissions (Smith et al., 2009; UNFCC, 2009). One of the most
lucid metrics for estimating the likelihood of staying within certain
levels of average temperature rise however is the cumulative
emissions of CO2 that are possible within a given timeframe.
Two of the most prominent examples of these ‘carbon budgets’
are provided by Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009.
Meinshausen et al. indicate that if global CO2 emissions between
2000 and 2050 are limited to 1440 billion tonnes (Gt) CO2 then
there is a 50:50 chance of restricting the average global tempera-
ture rise to 2 1C. Allen et al. examine a longer time horizon and
argue that cumulative emissions of one trillion tonnes of carbon, or
3660 Gt CO2, over all time would similarly give an evens chance of a
2 1C average temperature rise. Of this trillion tonnes they indicate
that around half has been emitted already.
Consequent to the concept of carbon budgets, many authors and
organisations (e.g. IEA, 2012, Leaton, 2011, Meinshausen et al., 2009)
have sought to relate estimates of the recoverable resources of fossil
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fuels, or some portion thereof,1 to these budgets. Meinshausen et al.
themselves for example suggested that the combustion CO2 emis-
sions of global reported ‘proved reserves’ of oil, gas and coal reserves
in 2009, estimated to total around 2800 Gt CO2, was almost double
the carbon budget for the ﬁrst half of the 21st century. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) also frequently publishes a com-
mentary on the volumes and distribution of reserves that can be
utilised in a low-carbon scenario (see e.g. IEA, 2012). Similarly others
have predicted a ‘carbon bubble’ arising from the fact that large
quantities of proved reserves of listed fossil fuel producers cannot be
burned because their embodied CO2 emissions surpass the limits
suggested by these climate models (Leaton, 2011); it is hence argued
that their market values are signiﬁcantly inﬂated.
These simple arithmetic sum or accounting approaches provide
useful context when discussing the large potential resource base
of fossil fuels. However they fail to account for many of the true
dynamics involved when considering which resources should or
should not be consumed. Examples of the factors that are not
captured include: the role of CCS and/or biomass to create zero
or potentially negative emissions, process emissions for example
the natural gas required to produce certain categories2 of oil and
gas, the role of resources that are not currently considered
reserves such as those that are not currently economic to produce
or those resources estimated to be undiscovered, and substitution
between the different types of fossil fuel. A further key factor
overlooked is the consideration that some volumes of each of the
fossil fuels need be produced in order to satisfy energy demand
during the transition towards a low-carbon energy system.3
It therefore remains an open question what volume of fossil fuels
can be used and where these are located while attempting to keep
average temperature rises below 2 1C.
There are a wide range of models available that can incorporate
such effects that can help inform this discussion however.
For example, energy systems or integrated assessment models
used for the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) and
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) by the IPCC, 2000;
van Vuuren et al., 2011, or shorter-term whole system simulation
models such as by Shell, 2013 and the IEA, 2012, or oil-sector
speciﬁc models such as by Statoil, 2012. These are employed by
a variety of organisations including upstream oil and gas compa-
nies, international organisations, consultancies, and academic
institutions. While these models have a number of uses they tend
to be used to generate outlooks for energy production and
consumption rather than using modelling results to examine the
fossil fuel resources that are available but that remain unused over
their speciﬁc modelling horizons (e.g. IEA, 2012).
The outlooks from other organisations also disregard modelling
a pathway to 2 1C, preferring to examine uncertainty in factors
other than limiting CO2 emissions or only producing only a ‘most
likely’ pathway or forecast (BP, 2013; EIA, 2011; ExxonMobil, 2013;
Shell, 2011,2013). A separate subset of studies on the other hand
focus on one sector in isolation and so can fail to capture the full
range of possible substitution between different energy types (e.g.
Campbell and Heapes, 2009; Schindler and Zitell, 2008 look solely
at the oil market).
CO2 constraints also play an important, although rarely dis-
cussed, role in another active and ongoing debate surrounding the
availability of oil. Estimates of oil resources and reserves can vary
for a range of technical, socio-economics, and deﬁnitional factors
(McGlade, 2012) and so differences in assumptions can lead to a
wide range of estimates in volumes of oil considered to be
recoverable. Possible reductions to oil availability arising from
constraints placed on CO2 emissions are a further uncertainty that
should be considered when estimating recoverable resources,
especially when estimating volumes of oil reserves.
This paper seeks to quantify what oil resources can and cannot
be used during the transition to a low-carbon energy system, the
nature of these resources, and where they are located. To take
account of the dynamics of the energy system more robustly than
simple accounting methods we use an innovative approach linking
the outputs of a technology-rich whole energy systems model
(TIAM-UCL) with a data-rich bottom up oil ﬁeld level model
(called the ‘Bottom Up Economic and Geological Oil ﬁeld produc-
tion model’ or BUEGO). TIAM-UCL is ﬁrst used to generate an
estimate of the most cost-effective energy system that limits
the global average temperature rise to 2 1C. Two different scenar-
ios are examined and hence TIAM-UCL generates two overall oil
demand levels that are commensurate with a low-carbon energy
system. These are then used as an input to BUEGO which provides
a detailed characterisation of the oil resources that are and are not
used under these scenarios.
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows: Section 2
provides an overview of the two models employed, TIAM-UCL and
BUEGO, the assumptions on which they rely, and the scenarios
that are generated in this work. Section 3 next examines
the outputs of these models and the insights that can be drawn,
while Section 4 provides a discussion of these results looking in
particular at the policy implications and concludes.
2. Approach
This section provides a brief description of TIAM-UCL and BUEGO,
including their strengths and weaknesses, and how the hybrid
approach adopted in this work mitigates many of the latter. A more
detailed description of the two models is provided in the Appendix.
This section also describes the two alterative scenarios run in this
work and the manner in which they have been developed.
2.1. TIAM-UCL
TIAM-UCL is an adapted version of the TIMES Integrated Assess-
ment Model (ETSAP-TIAM), a linear programming partial equilibrium
model developed and maintained by the Energy Technology Systems
Analysis Programme (ETSAP) (Loulou and Labriet, 2007). TIMES is an
acronym for ‘The Integrated MARKAL–EFOM System’, with MARKAL
and EFOM themselves also acronyms standing for ‘MARket ALloca-
tion’ and ‘Energy Flow Optimisation’ models.
The new 16-region TIAM-UCL model breaks out the UK from the
previousWestern Europe region in the 15-region ETSAP–TIAMmodel
and contains an enhanced representation of oil and gas resources
and production mechanics. TIAM-UCL is technology-rich, bottom up,
1 There is no standard for reporting fossil fuel reserves and resources that is
globally accepted and employed by all analysts, which explains much of the
unnecessary confusion that can arise when discussing fossil fuel availability. This
work relies upon the following deﬁnitions throughout: reserves can be reported
according to their probability of production (1P – proved, 2P – proved and
probable, and 3P – proved, probable and possible corresponding to volumes with
a 90%, 50% and 10% chance of being exceeded respectively), with 2P being the
most useful estimate. Reserves are only one element within the more encom-
passing resource base which can be reported as economically (available in current
economic conditions), technically (available with current technology), or ulti-
mately (available with current and future technology) recoverable. Resources are
themselves a subset of the fossil fuel in place which includes volumes that will
never be recovered. See McGlade, 2012 for a more detailed explanation.
2 In this work we use the word category to distinguish between the individual
elements of oil that can be identiﬁed that make up the global resource base. For oil
these comprise: existing 2P reserves, reserve growth, undiscovered, Arctic oil, light
tight oil, and natural gas liquids, which here are assumed all to be conventional oil,
and natural bitumen, extra-heavy oil, and kerogen oil, which are taken here to be
unconventional oil. The exact deﬁnitions of these terms are given in McGlade, 2012.
3 The phrase ‘low-carbon energy system’ is used to refer to an energy system
that results in an evens chance of limiting the global average temperature rise to
2 1C.
C. McGlade, P. Ekins / Energy Policy 64 (2014) 102–112 103
whole-system model. It models all primary energy sources (oil, gas,
coal, nuclear, biomass, and renewables) from resource production
through to their conversion, infrastructure requirements, and ﬁnally
to sectoral end-use. The scenarios generated in this paper use the
elastic demand version of the model, which allows energy service
demands to react to changes in commodity prices, and that max-
imises societal welfare (the sum of consumer and producer surplus).
All scenarios are run with perfect foresight.
An advantage of using a long-term energy system model such as
TIAM-UCL is that it is possible to run the model for much longer
periods than as reported in results: path dependency means that
costs and emissions reductions after the ﬁnal date for which results
are reported will affect results prior to that date. The modelling
period in TIAM-UCL therefore runs from 2005 to 2100, with results
presented in ﬁve year increments, but since results are used as an
input to BUEGO, which has a time horizon to 2035, only results
between 2010 and 2035 are actually used.
All categories of conventional and unconventional oil as set out
above are modelled separately in TIAM-UCL within a total of 16 basic
regions, and individual availabilities and costs of production are
speciﬁed within each. However, within Africa, Central and South
America and the Middle East, there is also the option of further
disaggregating members of OPEC. Fischer–Tropsch liquids such as
coal-to-liquids, gas-to-liquids and biofuels are also included.
Energy demands in the industrial, commercial, residential, trans-
port and upstream sectors are all modelled separately within each
region and rely upon a variety of demand drivers. Fuel switching and
substitution to and from the reﬁned products and categories such as
natural gas liquids (NGL) are allowed depending on the technologies
available in each sector.
The climate module of TIAM-UCL can be used to project the
effects of GHG emissions on atmospheric concentrations of these
gases, average global temperature rises, and radiative forcing, or
to constrain the model to certain bounds on these variables.
As mentioned above, within this work oil demand is taken from
TIAM-UCL under the scenarios generated and used as an input
to BUEGO. A more detailed explanation of input assumptions,
approaches, and data sources for TIAM-UCL can be found in the
Appendix and in Anandarajah et al., 2011.
2.2. BUEGO
The ‘Bottom Up Economic and Geological Oil ﬁeld production
model’ or BUEGO is a new bottom-up medium-term model that
incorporates the major economic factors (such as production costs,
investment rates, the oil price, and elastic response to changes
in price) and geological factors (such as decline rates and potential
capacity additions) affecting oil production. BUEGO models the
behaviour of oil production companies choosing to develop
projects on the basis of required global demand and each project's
net present value. BUEGO contains historical data from 1992 to
2009 and models the period between 2010 and 2035.
The model consists of a data-rich representation of over 7000
producing, undiscovered, and discovered but undeveloped oil
ﬁelds including ﬁeld-speciﬁc decline rates, 2P reserves, potential
capacity increases, water depths, and capital and operating costs.
BUEGO also incorporates the existing ﬁscal regimes of 133 coun-
tries (covering all existing oil production globally) including how
these differ within a country depending on the characteristics
or location of oil produced and the oil price.
BUEGO iteratively increases the oil price in each year to ensure
there is sufﬁcient new capacity coming on-line from projects with
positive net present value to satisfy the demand levels provided by
TIAM-UCL. A yearly average oil price is generated endogenously
by BUEGO that is taken to be the minimum oil price necessary
to bring on the marginal project to meet global demand in a
given year.
A project's net present value is calculated by taking into
account project speciﬁc details including costs, additional capacity
available and decline rates, and country speciﬁc details such as tax
regimes and discount rates. Since government tax takes can vary
widely between different ﬁscal regimes, between different coun-
tries, between different price levels, and between different
assumed capital costs, BUEGO individually generates the tax take
of each country for each project at each price iteration in each year
when calculating the net present value of a given project.
A number of different categories of ﬁeld are included within
BUEGO: ﬁelds that were in production prior to 2010 (‘developed’),
ﬁelds that were discovered before 2010 but which have not yet
come on stream (‘undeveloped’), ﬁelds discovered over ten years
ago and for which there are no plans for development (‘fallow’),
and ﬁelds that are undiscovered as of 2010 (‘undiscovered’).
BUEGO also includes potential reserve growth from discovered
ﬁelds, Arctic ﬁelds, extra-heavy oil (predominantly within Vene-
zuela) and natural bitumen produced by either in situ or mining
processes (predominantly within Canada).
2.3. Combination of models and scenarios
Considered separately neither TIAM-UCL nor BUEGO are ideally
placed to inform or quantify the oil resources that are or are not
produced under different scenarios.
TIAM-UCL as a large-scale, long-term energy system model that
encompasses all energy types is not ideally placed to examine oil-
sector speciﬁc details. The oil module of TIAM-UCL has been
designed to be consistent with the detailed aspects of BUEGO,
but nevertheless the regional make up means that a large level
of aggregation is necessary. Rates of decline in oil production
representing the natural decline rate of oil ﬁelds (Sorrell et al.,
2012) are introduced by constraints for example, however in
TIAM-UCL these constraints can only be speciﬁed at the regional
level. Furthermore, it does not include taxes, which can have an
important inﬂuence on the relative cost-effectiveness of different
potential oil capacity additions.
On the other hand, BUEGO does not incorporate any demand
projections. Some models of oil demand simply rely upon the
extrapolation of historic demand levels (see e.g. Voudouris et al.,
2011, and a number of the models reviewed by Sorrell et al., 2010
and Bentley et al., 2009). However, these fail to take account of
a wide variety of crucial factors including substitution, impacts
of demand side policies (e.g. efﬁciency mandates or CO2 reduction
measures), and price, all of which affect oil demand. While BUEGO
includes oil demand elasticity related to the endogenously calcu-
lated oil price, by itself it would also be unable to incorporate
these factors affecting the overall demand for oil. In addition, some
categories of oil are not included: light tight oil, natural gas liquids,
kerogen oil and the Fischer-Tropsch liquids are not speciﬁcally
modelled.
The linking of these two models seeks to counteract these
problems. Demand for oil from 2010 (the ﬁrst modelling period
in BUEGO) to 2012 is based on historical data but after this is taken
as an input using results from TIAM-UCL for all periods to 2035.
The categories of liquid fuels not included within BUEGO (i.e. light
tight oil, NGL, and biofuels) can be taken from TIAM-UCL when
results for all-oil are reported.
TIAM-UCL also generates CO2 prices and the CO2 intensity
of unconventional oil production. These are also input to BUEGO.
The product of these two factors is used to generate an additional
cost mark-up to unconventional oil production to model the
effects of the CO2 emission reductions requirements on its prod-
uction.
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Finally, although BUEGO calculates its own annual oil price (as
it has a much more data-rich representation of production
potential, and also includes taxes), BUEGO uses the prices of oil
from TIAM-UCL as its base prices. Demand within BUEGO
responds to changes in its endogenously calculated oil price from
the base prices given by TIAM-UCL with short and medium-term
price elasticities. The ﬂow of data from TIAM-UCL to BUEGO is
shown schematically in Fig. 1.
Two scenarios are modelled in this work but in both the model is
constrained to keep the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to below
425 ppm (ppm) in all years up to 2100. The IEA indicates that this is
commensurate with an atmospheric concentration of all greenhouse
gases (GHG) of 450 ppm and results in an equal chance of keeping
the average global temperature rise below 2 1C (IEA, 2011).4
It is assumed that there will be a global effort to mitigate
emissions and so in addition to this overarching constraint, regional
emissions caps are also imposed to model a more realistic scenario of
achieving this: these will not necessarily be binding. These reduc-
tions are described in detail in Anandarajah and McGlade, 2012,
but rely upon 2020 constraints based upon the maximum pledges
made as part of the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCC, 2009), and
maximum 2050 GHG emissions of 1.5 tCO2/capita globally.
The ﬁrst scenario (LCS) has optimistic assumptions regarding
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) availability. Very relaxed
constraints are placed on the uptake and diffusion of CCS technologies:
in 2020 in each region CCS can be applied to a maximum of 15%
of total electricity generation while in the industrial sector it can
capture between 10–20% of process and process heat emissions
(depending on the technology and speciﬁc sector). After 2020 all
CCS technologies can grow at a maximum rate of between 10 and 15%
per year. Some maximum levels of CCS penetration are applied
in certain sectors, so for example a maximum of 54% of emissions
can be captured from process heat technologies in the iron and steel
industries (it is assumed that CCS, which has a 90% capture rate, can
be applied to 60% of total emissions), but from 2030 CCS is free to be
applied to the majority of processes and technologies without
restriction.
The second scenario (LCS-noCCS) assumes that CCS is not available.
While CCS is essentially unable to mitigate emissions from the
consumption of oil directly – except in the unlikely case of oil being
used in the electricity sector – the absence of widespread availability
of CCS will increase the cost of decarbonisation (because of the 2 1C
temperature constraint and the consequent required emission reduc-
tions) and give rise to a much higher CO2 shadow price: oil consu-
mption will likely thus be signiﬁcantly affected.5 In this scenario it is
assumed that CCS is unavailable in any time period in either the
electricity or industrial sectors.
2.4. Oil availability
Before examining the volumes of oil that are used in each scenario,
it is useful to understand the volumes of oil that are available, as a
number of different metrics could be used. While no speciﬁc time-
frame is given for oil volumes to be classiﬁed as reserves (by the SPE
Petroleum Resources Management System (PRMS) for example (SPE,
AAPG, 2008)) the most useful comparison metric when looking at
cumulative production over a 25 year time period (from 2010 to 2035)
is likely to be 2P reserve ﬁgures. 2P reserves are the median estimate
of the volume of oil that can be recovered under current conditions.
Volumes of reserves are notoriously difﬁcult to estimate, but in
Table 1 we present our estimates of 2P reserves based on the
aggregation of 2P reserve ﬁeld level data within BUEGO and as repo-
rted by a variety of sources (e.g. Herrmann et al., 2010; Schindler and
Zitell, 2008). These estimates include both conventional and uncon-
ventional oil and to correlate with the beginning of the modelling
period of BUEGO are the reserve volumes as of 2010. They do not
therefore contain any signiﬁcant volumes from light tight oil because
these were then not considered reserves. However, they do contain
reserves held in ‘fallow’ ﬁelds (as deﬁned above), since these
volumes are generally included in the reserves databases produced
by reporting agencies.
An alternative and more frequently reported volume of reco-
verable oil is the ‘proved’ reserves by BP, 2012, for example. These
‘proved’ reserves are supposed to be a more conservative estimate
of the volume of oil recoverable than 2P reserves. However, as can
be seen in Table 1, they are greater in four of the eleven regions
shown and 25% greater on a global scale. We consider 1P reserves
to be signiﬁcantly less useful than 2P reserves for a variety of
reasons as discussed by McGlade, 2012. For example there is
a need for proper statistical procedures to aggregate individual
ﬁeld or country estimates of 1P reserves yet this appears to be
rarely carried out in practice (McGlade, 2012).
Fig. 1. Schematic of relationship between inputs and outputs of TIAM-UCL and
BUEGO. Note: ‘UCO’ is unconventional oil, ‘LTO’ light tight oil, and ‘NGL’ natural gas
liquids.
4 TIAM-UCL projects emissions for the major categories of GHG: CO2, CH4, and
N2O, the latter two of which are usually collectively referred to as non-CO2
emissions. The majority of these non-CO2 emissions come from the agricultural
sector (IPCC, 2007) which, since they are not directly related to the energy sector,
are introduced into the model using exogenous assumptions. There are signiﬁcantly
fewer mitigation options available in TIAM-UCL for the non-CO2 gases and so the
model is better able to provide insights on how to mitigate CO2 emissions rather
than all GHG emissions. CO2 emissions only are therefore explicitly modelled in this
work – non-CO2 emissions are changed exogenously depending on the strength of
the GHG emissions targets, in order to simulate the restriction of GHG emissions
overall.
5 The reason for this is that if CCS reduces the emissions from coal and gas-
ﬁred power generation, a larger carbon budget remains for oil. Lack of CCS with a
given CO2 constraint will therefore reduce the possible use of oil even though CCS
is not used to reduce emissions from oil directly.
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More importantly, however, is that these ‘proved’ volumes rely
on the publically declared ﬁgures from individual countries rather
than any audited procedure. The ‘proved’ reserves declared by
Canada and Venezuela of 175 billion barrels (Gb) and 297 Gb,
which predominantly comprise natural bitumen and extra-heavy
oil respectively, are particularly questionable. Using BUEGO to run
a scenario in which there are no constraints on production for
either economic or environmental reasons results in a maximum
technical cumulative production of unconventional oil in Canada
and Venezuela over the next 25 years of 63 Gb and 22 Gb
respectively. It is therefore hard to justify how volumes almost
three and thirteen times as large as this can be viewed as ‘proved’
reserves. There are similar concerns about the proved reserves of
a number of Middle Eastern members of OPEC, in particular
Kuwait, which consistently declares reserves of around 100 Gb
(OPEC, 2012) while most other sources relying on alternative
procedures to generate their estimates report values closer to
50 Gb (Campbell and Heapes, 2009; IEA, 2005; Schindler and
Zitell, 2008). These, amongst many other reasons demonstrate
why 2P reserve estimates that do not rely upon public declarations
are signiﬁcantly more useful when examining the volumes of oil
that can and cannot be utilised.
Another metric that is interesting to compare with cumulative
production is the remaining ultimately recoverable resources
(URR) – the volume of oil remaining that is recoverable over
all time with both current and future technology. Estimates
of conventional and unconventional remaining URR within each
country and region are also presented in Table 1. Even more
so than estimates of reserves, estimates of the URR are extremely
uncertain. The values shown are the central estimates only
generated using a procedure described by McGlade, 2013. These
point ﬁgures fail to capture the extent of uncertainty and large
conﬁdence bounds that exist within each country and region,
particularly for unconventional oil, but they nevertheless provide
an idea of the maximum volumes that may be producible
if concerns over CO2 were to be ignored. The global URR totals
around 5100 Gb split approximately equally between conventional
and unconventional oil.
3. Results
This section presents the results for the outlook for oil combining
the results of TIAM-UCL and BUEGO. Supply projections rely upon
BUEGO for the reserve, reserve growth, undiscovered, Arctic oil,
natural bitumen (produced by both mined and in situ methods), and
extra-heavy oil categories and TIAM-UCL for any contribution from
natural gas liquids, light tight oil and biofuels. No kerogen
oil production appears in any set of results prior to 2035. Results
are ﬁrst given on a global and regional scale before looking in more
detail at the United Kingdom and Canada. Details of the outlook for
the wider energy and electricity system for similar scenarios are
provided in Anandarajah and McGlade, 2012.
3.1. Global and regional results
Fig. 2 presents the outlooks for all oil in the LCS (top) and LCS-
noCCS (bottom) scenarios with oil production separated by ﬁeld
type or category.
Table 1
Declared 1P reserves, 2P reserves and remaining ultimately recoverable resources
of oil from a selection of countries and regions.
Country/Region ‘Proved’ reserves 2P reserves Remaining
URR
CO UCO
Brazil 14 32 110 25
Canada 175 53 58 630
Mexico 12 12 80 0
Russia 87 96 280 190
Norway 7 11 36 0
UK 3 7 21 5
USA 31 50 180 650
Venezuela 297 85 80 420
Africa – OPEC 110 83 190 15
Africa – Other 23 28 100 50
Australia and New Zealand 4 6 33 130
Central and South America 325 136 290 450
China and India 21 38 90 110
CIS 126 152 360 360
Europe 14 25 110 35
Japan and South Korea 0 0 0 0
Middle East 766 689 1050 12
North America 218 115 320 1300
Other developing Asia 17 23 75 4
OPEC 1167 847 1270 470
Non-OPEC 455 448 1350 2000
OECD 235 143 390 1450
Non-OECD 1387 1150 2250 1000
Global 1622 1294 2620 2470
Note: CO is conventional oil and UCO unconventional oil. URR are the remaining
ultimately recoverable resources as deﬁned in the text. All ﬁgures are from the
authors (McGlade, 2013) except the ‘proved reserves’ which come from BP, 2012.
Numbers are in billion barrels (Gb) and may not add due to rounding.
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Fig. 2. Global production in LCS (top) and LCS-noCCS (bottom) split by resource
category.
Note: see main body of text for deﬁnitions of the classiﬁcations of oil when split
by type.
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Total production in 2010 and 2011 is 84.2 and 85.4 million barrels
per day (mb/d) respectively, which compares to 82.5 mb/d and
83.6 mb/d as reported by BP, 2012 and 86.9 mb/d and 87.1 mb/d as
reported by EIA, 2012a, 2012b. The slight differences arise primarily
from different reporting assumptions and conversion factors.
In LCS production is highest in 2025 at just under 90 mb/d, up
around 6% from 2010 production levels. Between 2015 and 2025
production is on somewhat of a plateau averaging 88 mb/d, which
after 2025 starts to decline at around 0.8%/year. In LCS-noCCS
production reaches a peak in 2015 at a lower level of 85.6 mb/d, up
only around 2% from production in 2010, and declines thereafter.
This decline is most rapid up to 2025 at around 2%/year with
production dropping below 80 mb/d in 2020. In 2028 production
falls just below 70 mb/d but approximately maintains this level
for the rest of the model horizon. In LCS cumulative production of
conventional and unconventional oil between 2010 and 2035 is
810 Gb while in LCS-noCCS it is 706 Gb.
In LCS there is only a very minor contribution from Arctic oil6
production and only in later periods. Production does not com-
mence until after 2020 and rises slowly reaching 420 thousand
barrels per day (kb/d) in 2035, the majority of which (80%) comes
from Greenland; cumulative production over the model horizon
is just over 1 Gb, approximately 2.5% of the total availability of
Arctic oil included within BUEGO, and around 0.1% total cumula-
tive production from all sources. In LCS-noCCS there is no
production from Arctic oil in any periods.
Light tight oil production is also relatively small in LCS, rising
from 120 kb/d in 2010 (entirely within the United States) but rising
on a global scale to surpass 1 mb/d after 2030. 2010 production is
slightly below the level actually experienced (300 kb/d (EIA,
2012a, 2012b)) but more importantly does not follow the rapid
development that has been witnessed between 2010 and 2012,
or as is currently forecast (EIA, 2012a, 2012b). The key reason for
this is simply that this oil, currently estimated to have higher cost
than many other sources, is not required given the availability
of sources of oil elsewhere to satisfy global production. Tight oil
production in LCS-noCCS is similar to LCS in 2010 but peaks
in 2015 at 300 kb/d before declining entirely by 2020.
The only category of oil with greater cumulative production in
LCS-noCCS than LCS is biofuels. Both scenarios follow similar paths
up to 2020 but thereafter production in LCS-noCCS rises more
rapidly surpassing 1 mb/d in 2022, 3 mb/d in 2030, and almost
reaching 5 mb/d by 2035; in LCS production is under 2 mb/d
in 2035. An important difference between the production of
biofuels in the two scenarios is that in LCS the Fischer–Tropsch
production processes are used with CCS. It is assumed that these
have effectively net negative emissions. Obviously the use of CCS
is not possible in LCS-noCCS. With a much higher CO2 price in LCS-
noCCS biofuels are employed on a much more widespread basis as
they embody the only manner by which to decarbonise certain
sectors (e.g. aviation). There is also a much larger demand
for biofuels in the industrial sector particularly as a petrochemical
feedstock (bio-naphtha). In TIAM-UCL lifecycle emissions are
assumed to be lower when employed as a feedstock than when
combusted and so the use of biofuels in the industrial sector
represents one of the few ways in which to achieve slightly net
negative lifecycle emissions.
Table 2
Cumulative production between 2010 and 2035 (Cum prod) in the two scenarios compared with reported ‘proved reserves’, 2P reserves and URR from 2010.
Country/Region Cum prod LCS Cum prod in LCS-noCCS Cum prod
to 2P LCS
Cum prod
to 2P
LCS-noCCS
Unburnable
2P reserves
in LCS
Unburnable
2P reserves
in LCS-noCCSCO UCO UCL CO UCO UCL
Brazil 46 0 3 33 0 3 147% 105% 0 0
Canada 12 23 0 8 15 1 67% 43% 18 30
Mexico 15 0 0 10 0 1 121% 83% 0 2
Russia 94 0 0 82 0 0 98% 86% 2 14
Norway 15 0 0 12 0 2 137% 107% 0 0
UK 9 0 0 7 0 2 122% 99% 0 0
USA 75 0 0 57 0 2 149% 113% 0 0
Venezuela 18 4 0 15 3 0 26% 22% 63 66
Africa – OPEC 60 0 0 48 0 0 72% 58% 23 35
Africa – Other 22 0 3 20 0 3 78% 72% 6 8
Australia and New Zealand 6 0 1 5 0 1 103% 90% 0 1
Central and South America 80 4 3 61 3 3 62% 48% 52 71
China and India 37 0 1 35 0 1 98% 94% 1 2
CIS 127 0 0 109 0 0 84% 72% 25 43
Europe 30 0 0 23 0 4 121% 92% 0 2
Japan and South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0
Middle East 302 0 2 294 0 2 44% 43% 387 395
North America 100 23 1 75 15 4 107% 78% 0 25
Other Developing Asia 20 0 0 17 0 1 86% 73% 3 6
OPEC 370 4 2 349 3 2 44% 42% 472 494
Non-OPEC 412 23 8 339 15 16 99% 79% 12 94
OECD 136 23 2 103 15 8 110% 82% 0 26
Non-OECD 647 4 8 585 3 10 57% 51% 499 562
Global 783 27 10 688 18 18 63% 55% 485 588
Note: CO is conventional oil, UCO unconventional oil and UCL unconventional liquids. 2P reserves are as of 2010 and include CO and UCO; ratios of production thus do not
include the contribution from UCL. Numbers are in billion barrels (Gb). As noted previously, since some countries produce more than their reserves up to 2035, the regional
and aggregated un-burnable totals will not necessarily equal the sum of un-burnable reserves from all countries that they encompass.
6 Following McGlade, 2012 in this work Arctic oil is deﬁned as that oil that was
not in production or planned to be developed as of 2010.
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Table 2 next presents the cumulative volumes of oil that are
used in these scenarios in a number of countries and regions.
Table 2 also displays the ratios of cumulative conventional and
unconventional production relative to the 2P reserve estimates
and also the volumes of 2P reserves that are not produced.7
When comparing with 2P reserves on a global scale it is
immediately apparent that a large portion of the reserve base
remains unused in both scenarios: 485 Gb in LCS and 588 Gb in
LCS-noCCS. 8 In a scenario with no CCS almost half of the current
reserve base needs to remain unused in the next 25 years. This
difference, equivalent to the entire conventional 2P reserves of the
OECD, demonstrates the huge importance of CCS in the future of
oil production.
While on a global scale these reserves must remain un-burned
prior to 2035, utilisation of the reserve base varies greatly on a
more regional scale. Fig. 3 presents the production split by region
in the two scenarios. The Middle Eastern members of OPEC
increase their share of total production in both scenarios and also
manage to maintain an approximately equal (although slightly
lower) level of production in LCS-noCCS compared with LCS. From
a share of total production of 29% in 2010, these countries increase
their share to 38% in 2035 in LCS and 45% in LCS-noCCS. The
regions with the largest absolute difference between the two
scenarios are North America, Central and South America (CSA),
and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in which
production in the ﬁnal periods are respectively 5 mb/d, 3 mb/d,
and 2 mb/d lower in LCS-noCCS than LCS.
The Middle East (both members of OPEC and those countries
which are not) nevertheless uses the least volume of its reserves in
absolute terms, producing around 390 Gb less than its 2P reserves
base by 2035 in both scenarios. Venezuela produces the lowest
proportion of its estimated 2P reserves base leaving 74% and 78%
unproduced by 2035 in LCS and LCS-noCCS respectively while Canada
also leaves a high percentage of reserves un-burned: 33% and 57%.
Production in both of these countries is much lower because of
the failure to develop their unconventional oil resources: 63 Gb
Venezuelan 2P reserves and 18 Gb Canadian 2P reserves remain
un-burned in LCS, and 66 Gb and 30 Gb if CCS is not available on a
widespread basis. If the above ‘proved ﬁgures’ were to be preferred,
although these are questionable for the reasons described, then at
least 140 Gb and 275 Gb reserves in Canada and Venezuela cannot be
produced prior to 2035 even if CCS is widely available. The large-
scale deployment of the unconventional resources is evidently not
commensurate with achieving a low-carbon energy system.
As noted above kerogen oil plays no role in either of the two
scenarios: the United States has a potentially huge resource base,
as shown in its unconventional ultimately recoverable resource
base in Table 1, but since none of these were classiﬁed as reserves
in 2010 (or currently), the United States actually produces more
than its 2010 reserves base. A similar result is seen in a number of
individual countries in LCS, although only three individual coun-
tries (Brazil, Norway and the United States) and no regions
produce more than their 2010 reserves up to 2035 in LCS-noCCS.
As shown above in Fig. 2, a large proportion of production
comes from both undiscovered sources and reserve growth, both
of which are not classiﬁed as reserves. This suggests that in a few
countries continued development of new oil resources does not
mean that it is impossible to achieve an evens chance of limiting
the global average temperature to 2 1C, but this is true only if a far
greater number of countries do not develop their entire reserve
base (as demonstrated by the ratio of global cumulative produc-
tion to reserves base) and indeed only if, as given in results from
TIAM-UCL, there is rapid decarbonisation of other parts of the
energy system, in particular the electricity sector.
Following the destruction of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the
Macondo ﬁeld, there has been an active debate surrounding
the ongoing production of deepwater9 resources. As described
above in Section 2.2, BUEGO includes the water depths of all
existing ﬁelds as well as estimating the water depth of undiscov-
ered ﬁelds.
Cumulative production of deepwater oil is 55% of the total deep-
water oil resource (reserves, reserve growth and undiscovered total-
ling around 110 Gb) in LCS reducing to 37% in LCS-noCCS, suggesting
that in each scenario 45% and 63%must remain in the ground. Looking
at deepwater resources undiscovered as of 2010, a large portion of the
oil discovered at water depths greater than 1000 m also remains
undeveloped in both scenarios. 23 Gb is assumed to discovered in
deepwater in both scenarios, yet 40% of this resource remains
undeveloped prior to 2035 in LCS, and 55% in LCS-noCCS.
Comparing with the volumes of remaining URR from Table 1,
global cumulative production in LCS up to 2035 comprises 30% of
the conventional and 1.1% of the unconventional URR while in LCS-
noCCS the respective ﬁgures are 26% and 0.7%. In both scenarios oil
production appears to have peaked by 2025 (driven by reductions
in demand resulting from the increasing carbon price) and so it is
clear that the overwhelming majority of the URR of all oil must
remain unused in a low-carbon energy system.
Next we examine two individual countries, the United King-
dom and Canada, to provide further insights on the underlying
dynamics and the oil that remains unused in each. Canada is useful
to examine given its large potential resource of unconventional
oil, while the UK demonstrates the changes in a relatively mature
oil producing region and the relevance of ongoing exploration
efforts.
3.2. Country level results
3.2.1. United Kingdom
Fig. 4 presents the outlook for oil production in the United
Kingdom in both scenarios considered here. The United Kingdom is
a mature oil province in which oil production previously reached a
peak in 1999 at around 3 mb/d and has been declining since.
As can be seen in Fig. 4, production does not reach the levels seen
previously, however in LCS the decline is moderated somewhat:
ﬁrstly between 2012 and 2018 production averages just over 1.2 mb/d
with some slight variation, before dropping to a lower plateau of
around 0.85 mb/d between 2020 and 2027. Thereafter production
declines at around 4%/year. The decline in developed ﬁelds is mainly
offset by new ﬁeld developments and reserve growth. Indeed there
is quite a large contribution from reserve growth, totalling 2.3 Gb
between 2010 and 2035, which comes not only from the application
of Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) but also from existing ﬁeld exten-
sions and the delineation of new reservoirs within existing ﬁelds.
In LCS-noCCS there is also a slight reversal of the decline seen
from 2005 to 2010 with production stable at 1.2 mb/d up to 2015.
Thereafter the decline in conventional production is much more
apparent than in LCS, which despite a slight upturn in 2023 falls at
7 The unconventional liquids (biofuels and other Fischer–Tropsch liquids) are
excluded from this comparison since these are unlikely to be included in each
country's and region's reserve ﬁgures.
8 Note that since some countries produce more than their reserves up to 2035,
the regional and aggregated un-burnable totals from Table 2 will not necessarily
equate to the sum of un-burnable reserves from all countries that they encompass.
For example, although Canada has un-burnable reserves in LCS, since the United
States and Mexico produces more than their 2P reserves, North America has no un-
burnable reserves.
9 'Deepwater oil' is a somewhat ill-deﬁned term, with different sources
providing different boundaries. It is deﬁned here to be resources at water depths
greater than 1000 m.
C. McGlade, P. Ekins / Energy Policy 64 (2014) 102–112108
an average of 5%/year until 2035. The contribution from reserve
growth is much more muted in LCS-noCCS, cumulative production
of which is around half that in LCS.
Nevertheless, as can be seen in Fig. 4, this decline in conven-
tional production is offset by a large uptake of biofuels. Biofuel
production starts in 2016 and rises rapidly reaching 200 kb/d just
after 2025, overtaking total conventional production just after
2030, and surpassing 500 kb/d by the end of the model horizon.
As a result of this large increase in production of biofuels the
United Kingdom is the only country in BUEGO in which production
is larger in the no-CCS case than in LCS. Results from TIAM-UCL
indicate that as well as using indigenous supplies of woody
biomass, the UK imports biomass from Western Europe and
latterly Central and South America.
The ongoing exploration efforts in the North Sea and Atlantic
Margin mean it is also of interest to examine the undiscovered
volumes of oil that are brought into production in the UK. The
contribution from undiscovered volumes is not as signiﬁcant as the
contribution from reserve growth with cumulative production less
than 1 Gb in both scenarios. Nevertheless, a number of previously
undiscovered ﬁelds do come on line in the UK. These vary by start
up date and production potential but total undiscovered resources
developed in the UK total 1.3 Gb in LCS, and just over 0.9 Gb in
LCS-noCCS.
It is possible to determine the location of undiscovered ﬁelds
that are brought on stream within BUEGO by examining the water
depths of new ﬁelds (the information for which for the UK comes
from DECC, 2012). In LCS, only one undiscovered ﬁeld is developed
in the West of Shetland region (at a water depth of greater than
1000 m and with 2P reserves of 93 mb (million barrels)) and not
until 15 years after it is discovered. Although other reserves
are discovered in the West of Shetland region, around 250 mb,
these are not brought into production. In LCS-noCCS, no ﬁelds in
the West of Shetland region are brought into production.
3.2.2. Canada
The outlook for Canadian oil production in both scenarios is shown
in Fig. 5. As described above, and also as evident from Table 2,
Canadian production is particularly affected by the absence of CCS. In
LCS production initially increases between 2010 and 2013 through the
development of new in situ bitumen projects. Declines in conventional
production then mean that overall production falls slightly out to 2020
before production from new bitumen projects (both mined and
in situ) increases steadily for the remainder of the model horizon.
By 2035 production of bitumen reaches 4.1 mb/d, up from 1.4 mb/d in
2010, with total production from all sources almost 6 mb/d.
By contrast in LCS-noCCS after a slight increase to 1.8 mb/d in
2012 no new bitumen projects come online. Declines in conventional
production therefore mean that overall production continues to
decline after 2020 although from 2023 a larger contribution from
biofuels (reaching 400 kb/d by 2035) offsets declines in conventional
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production so that overall production is steady at an average of
2.2 mb/d.
Natural bitumen whether produced by mined or in situ meth-
ods requires large quantities of external energy inputs, which
at present come almost entirely from natural gas and electricity.
TIAM-UCL however allows switching to alternative sources over
time such as coal, biomass, nuclear electricity, as well as the
adoption of CCS if it is available. The CO2 intensity of unconven-
tional oil production can therefore vary. TIAM-UCL also endogen-
ously calculates the marginal cost of CO2 and so by combining
the CO2 price and CO2 intensity it generates a cost markup to the
production costs of unconventional oil. This value, which changes
over time, is fed into BUEGO.
To understand the rise in unconventional production it is
therefore necessary to examine the energy that is consumed
in the production processes. We present in Fig. 6 the energy
inputs and CO2 intensity of synthetic crude oil (SCO) production by
in situ means in Canada in LCS (top) and in LCS-noCCS (bottom).
A similar pattern is observed in other countries with large
unconventional oil resources, such as Venezuela. The right hand
axis in both cases shows the production emissions given in kgCO2
per barrel of SCO produced. These are the emissions from extrac-
tion and upgrading but not from reﬁning or combustion. In both
cases in 2010 the emissions intensity is around 105 kgCO2/barrel
SCO, in line with values given by other sources (see e.g. Brandt,
2011; Burkhard et al., 2011). Most of the energy input is natural gas
with around 5% coming from coal and renewable sources, mainly
from the use of these sources to generate electricity, and the
remainder process coke that is produced and immediately re-used.
In LCS there is a rapid de-carbonisation of energy inputs:
within a 10 year time-frame the emissions intensity drops from
around þ100 kgCO2/ barrel SCO to 130 kgCO2/barrel SCO. This is
possible through a complete switch to the use of biomass with CCS
for heat and electricity generation and the production of hydrogen
(also required for the upgrading process) from coal, again with
CCS. As a result after 2020 there is no additional cost penalty from
process CO2 emissions associated with bitumen production by
in situ technologies. Such a transformation of the energy inputs to
SCO production would be anything but easy to attain in practice.
In LCS-noCCS the CO2 intensity is slightly lower in 2015 but the
absence of CCS means that the decarbonisation of energy inputs
is much more gradual. Since the marginal cost of CO2 is also much
higher in LCS-noCCS the cost mark up to bitumen production is
much higher than in LCS. New projects are thus much less likely
to become economic prior to 2035 although current projects can
continue since these do not require the large upfront capital costs
associated with new capacity additions. A similar pattern is seen
with mined bitumen projects and indeed with the extra-heavy oil
projects in Venezuela.
The switch to low CO2 intensity energy inputs therefore allows
unconventional production to proceed and ramp up in LCS. Never-
theless, despite this very rapid decarbonisation of energy inputs,
and allowing the widespread adoption of CCS, overall production
still does not reach the level suggested by many sources.
The National Energy Board of Canada (NEB, 2011) for example
suggests that total bitumen production in 2035 will reach 5.1 mb/d,
1 mb/d higher than in LCS. Sources such as the NEB do not comment
speciﬁcally on CO2 emissions or the decarbonisation of energy inputs
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but it is evident that their current projections are inconsistent with a
global low- carbon energy system. The production levels displayed
here should also be considered quite optimistic. The shift to low-
carbon energy inputs will likely carry large cost penalties through the
reliance on more diffuse and expensive resources such as biomass;
cost increases that are not reﬂected within BUEGO.10 Therefore in
reality while the decarbonisation of energy inputs will act to offset
cost penalties from high CO2 emissions they may actually make new
capacity additions less economic and so new investment less likely.
4. Discussion and conclusions
The above results demonstrate that large volumes of oil currently
considered to be reserves cannot be produced before 2035 if there is
to be an evens chance of limiting the global average temperature rise
to 2 1C.
On a global scale nearly 600 Gb of oil reserves must remain
unused by 2035 in a scenario where CCS is unavailable, around
45% of available reserves, while in a scenario allowing the wide-
spread and rapid adoption of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in
both the electricity and industry sectors, nearly 500 Gb must still
remain in situ. In a scenario with no CCS, no region can fully
exploit their reserves although some regions must leave greater
proportions of their reserves in situ than others: the Middle East
must not use 55% or around 390 Gb its current reserves
before 2035.
Besides reserves, the utilisation of four key categories and types
of oil resources in particular were examined.
First, Arctic oil played only a very minor role in the scenario with
CCS, and no role at all when CCS was not allowed. These results
suggest that the development of Arctic regions is largely inconsistent
with an evens chance of limiting average global temperature change
to 2 1C and that it may be reasonable to classify Arctic resources as
‘un-burnable’; this therefore calls into question the rationale for
ongoing exploration efforts in Arctic regions, if stated commitments
to emission reduction are to be taken seriously.
Second, light tight oil does not rise nearly as rapidly as currently
projected by some sources: it plays a minor role in a scenario with
CCS, while without CCS it reaches only a small level of production in
early periods before declining to nothing by 2020. There is a debate
currently ongoing regarding the role of shale gas in helping to reduce
CO2 emissions (see e.g. Helm, 2011; Pearson et al., 2012). This debate
is not addressed here, but these results suggest that any parallel
‘shale oil’ revolution would not be at all helpful in the transition to a
low-carbon energy system.
Third, on a global scale, at least 40% of deepwater resources that
are yet to be found must remain undeveloped, which rises to 55% if
CCS is not available. This relatively low utilisation of deepwater
discoveries calls into question, as with Arctic oil, the rationale for a
large portion of the ongoing exploration into deepwater resources,
much of which could not be burned (consistent with a low-carbon
energy system) even if they were discovered.
These proportions can be even larger on a country level as shown
by the example given for the United Kingdom and so results indicate
that new areas should not be licensed for exploration in the Atlantic
Margin until CCS is available to be fully deployed, and even then the
resources that can be developed must remain restricted.
Finally, results also demonstrate that the widespread develop-
ment of unconventional oil resources is incompatible with a
decarbonised energy system. Kerogen oil from sources such as
the United States plays no role at all in any scenario. In a scenario
without CCS there are next to no new natural bitumen or extra
heavy oil capacity additions, and so production continues at
current levels, falling slightly in later periods. In a scenario with
CCS, production of bitumen and extra heavy oil can increase from
current levels, but only if there is a rapid decarbonisation
of the energy inputs required for their production. Nevertheless,
even with CCS, cumulative production of both bitumen in Canada
and extra-heavy oil in Venezuela are signiﬁcantly below their
estimated 2P reserves. Although highly questionable, if the
declared ‘proved’ reserves of these countries were to be believed,
then 80% Canadian reserves and 92% Venezuelan reserves must
remain in the ground.
To conclude, a large disconnect appears to exist between
policies permitting exploration in new areas, particularly in Arctic
and deepwater areas, and pledges to restrict temperature rises to
2 1C. The continued licensing of new areas for oil exploration
is only consistent with declared intentions to limit CO2 emissions
and climate change if the majority of ﬁelds that are discovered
remain undeveloped, which fatally undermines the economic
rationale for their discovery in the ﬁrst place. Policies should
therefore not encourage either the development and exploitation
of all and every oil resource discovered, or the discovery of more
expensive resources. Such encouragement is simply incompatible
with limiting global temperature rises to 2 1C.
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